

Logic of Paryāpti Relation in Navya Nyāya

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Abstract

A novel relation called *paryāpti* has been accepted by the Navya Naiyāyikas for explaining certain cases, which are inexplicable through other relations. This relation is accepted to justify cognition of a property remaining in conjoint objects (*vyāsajyavṛttidharma*). The term *paryāpta* means ‘that which does neither exist in less places nor more places’ (*anyūnānatirikta*). The property - ‘two-ness’ (*dvitva*) exists sufficiently or completely or pervadingly in two substances (*dvitvaṁ dvayoḥ paryāptam*). In the expression - ‘The blue jar is not there’ (*nīlo ghaṭo nāsti*), the absentee (*pratiyogī*) is ‘a blue jar’ (*nīlo ghaṭaḥ*) and the limitors of the absenteness (*pratiyogitāvacchedaka*) are both blueness (*nīlatva*) and jarness (*ghaṭatva*). The property of being a limitor of an absenteness (*pratiyogitāvacchedaka*) remains in both ‘blueness’ (*nīlatva*) and ‘jarness’ (*ghaṭatva*) simultaneously through relation called *paryāptī*. A distinction has also been shown between *samavāya* and *paryāpti*.

Keywords: samavāya, avachhedaka, vivakṣā, vyāsajyavṛttidharma, ayutasiddha, anuyogitā, pratiyogitā

A novel relation called *paryāpti* has been accepted by the Navya Naiyāyikas for explaining certain cases, which are inexplicable through other relations. This relation is accepted to justify cognition of a property remaining in conjoint objects (*vyāsajyavṛttidharma*).¹ It may, otherwise, be explained as a property existing in both the loci simultaneously, but not in either of them separately. The property ‘bothness’ (*ubhayatva*) remains pervading both the entities, but not one (*ubhayatvamubhayatraiva paryāptam na tvekatra*).² This situation has been explained by accepting an additional relation called *paryāpti* by the Navya Naiyāyikas., which is one type of the *svarūpa* relations. If someone has a strong

desire to speak (*vivakṣā*), he can use the *paryāpti* relation in the following case also - 'The fireness sufficiently or pervadingly exists in an individual case of fire' (*vahnitvam ekasmin vahnau paryāptam*). If he has no such desire to speak in that fashion, these cases may also be explained through *samavāya* or inherence. The term '*paryāpta*' means 'that which does neither exist in less places nor more places' (*anyūñānatirikta*). The property - 'two-ness' (*dvitva*) exists sufficiently or completely or pervadingly in two substances (*dvitvam dvayoḥ paryāptam*).³ In the expression - 'The blue jar is not there' (*nīlo ghaṭo nāstī*), the absentee (*pratiyogī*) is 'a blue jar' (*nīlo ghaṭaḥ*) and the limitors of the absenteness (*pratiyogitāvachhedaka*) are both blueness (*nīlatva*) and jarness (*ghaṭatva*). The property of being a limitor of an absenteness (*pratiyogitāvachhedaka*) remains in both 'blueness' (*nīlatva*) and 'jarness' (*ghaṭatva*) simultaneously through relation called *paryāptī*.

In the first case when it is said that the fireness (*vahniva*) sufficiently or pervadingly remains in an individual fire (*vahnivyakti*), it indicates that each locus of fireness i.e., fire (*vahni*) is sufficiently endowed with or pervaded by fireness (*vahnitva*). Such case is not found in cases of 'two-ness' (*dvitva*) on account of the fact that the property of 'two-ness' (*dvitva*) remains always in two, jar and pot, for example, simultaneously. In other words, in 'two-ness' (*dvitva*) there is a sort of togetherness between jar and cloth. This property called *dvitva* exists in a jar and in a cloth simultaneously, which is indirectly pointing their sufficiently or pervadingly existing (*paryāpta*).⁴ In the like manner, the property of *avachhedakatā* (limitorness) is said to be sufficiently existing in both *nīlatva* (blueness) and *ghaṭatva* (jarness). In other words, it cannot exist in blueness alone and jarness alone and hence it is called insufficient (*aparyāpta*). For this reason, it is said that a jar is a jar but not two, twoness cannot exist in a jar and blueness alone becomes the limitor of the absenteness (*pratiyogitāvachhedaka*) or jarness alone becomes the limitor of the absenteness (*pratiyogitāvachhedaka*).⁵

From the above citation it is concluded that the notion of *paryāpti* is the pervasion of the locus. *Vahnitva* (fireness) remains pervadingly in its locus i.e., *vahni*, and the properties like *dvitva* (two-ness), *tritva* (three-ness), *pañcatva* (five-ness) etc. that are called *vyāsajya-vṛtti-padārtha* (entities remaining in more than one locus simultaneously) pervadingly exist in the requisite number of loci and the limitor of absentness (*pratiyogitāvachhedaka*) remains sufficiently in its required loci.⁶

Now a question may be raised regarding the acceptability of the relation called *paryāpti* if the matter is solved by *samavāya*. The property called *dvitva* (two-ness) remains in a substance (*dravya*) by virtue of being a *guṇa* (quality). As *dvitva* is a quality, it remains in a *dravya* as per Nyāya ontology. In the same way, *vahnitva* or fireness by virtue of being *jāti* (universal) must remain in its

locus i.e., an individual or *vyakti* by *samavāya* (inherence). If the purpose is served by *samavāya* (inherence), what is the necessity of admitting a separate relation called *paryāpti* or pervasion? In reply, it can be said that there is a difference between two things- simply existing in the locus and sufficiently pervading in the locus. If it is said that *vahnitva* (fireness) is inhered in *vahni* (fire), it is expressed in the following way - *vahnitvam ekasmin vahnau samavetam*. If, on the other hand, it is that *vahnitva* (fireness) pervadingly remains in *vahni* (fire), the same can be expressed in the following way- *vahnitvam ekasmin vahnau paryāptam*. These two statements or expressions are not of the same type. In case of *samavāya* (inherence) *vahnitva* or fireness is said to be an inseparable entity from *vahni* or fire, which is not exactly expressed in *paryāpti* (pervasion). In the former i.e., *samavāya* the notion of inseparability is being emphasized which is not done in *paryāpti* in the same fashion. The terms *samaveta* and *paryāpta* do not bear the same meaning due to having different connotations. The term *paryāpta* denotes sufficiency while *samaveta* denotes inseparability. It is the sweet will of the speaker (*vivakṣā*) which one is to be taken as a relation. A speaker has a liberty to look into the matter in the eye of *samavāya* or *paryāpti*. When it is said that there is sufficient (*paryāpta*) rainfall in this year, it signifies sufficient quantity of rainfall, but not the inherence (*samaveta*) of the same. If it is said that I have sufficient food in my house, it means the quantity of the food as much as I require, but not the question of inherence. For this reason, there is a necessity of admitting a relation called *paryāpti* over and above *samavāya*.⁷

The properties like *dvitva* (two-ness), *tritva* (three-ness) remain fully or sufficiently or pervadingly in two and three entities due to having the quality of pervading more than one locus (*vyāśajya-vṛtti-dharma*). In the same way, the property *pañcatva* (five-ness) simultaneously remains in five fingers or five *bhūta*-s (elements) like earth (*kṣiti*), water (*ap*), fire (*tejas*), air (*marut*) and ether (*ākāśa*). In this context the number five exists completely not in only one locus, but more than one locus i.e., in five loci sufficiently. The property remaining in many loci or more than one locus remains completely or pervadingly exists in the loci through the relation called *paryāpti*, the purpose of which will not be served by *samavāya*.

The property called *dviyva* remains individually in one locus or in the collection of individuals. If it cannot remain in locus individually; it cannot remain in the collection of both. In this case of *dvitva* there are two types of existence- one existing 'individually' and one existing 'collectively'. If *dvitva* exists in both jar and cloth 'individually', it is by *samavāya* relation. If the same property (*dvitva*) remains in both *ghaṭa* and *paṭa* 'collectively' or 'simultaneously', it is through *paryāpti* relation. In fact, the property *dvitva* cannot remain in two objects individually simultaneously. If it exists in two, it can exist one by one and hence

it is possible through *samavāya* relation. But if it exists collectively at a time covering both then this existence is completely pervading one called *paryāpti* relation.⁸

It may be argued that if the property *dvitva* does not exist individually in each of the collection, how can it exist collectively in both in the same relation? In other words, if *dvitva* does not exist individually in *ghaṭa* and *paṭa* by the relation of *paryāpti*, how can it be present in both *ghaṭa* and *paṭa* collectively through *paryāpti* relation? If it is agreed that *dvitva* remains in both *ghaṭa* and *paṭa* each by *paryāpti*, how can *samavāya* be justified? If there is no necessity of *paryāpti* as additional relation due to serving its purpose by *samavāya* alone, let *samavāya* alone be accepted. Or if *paryāpti* is admitted as a relation to serve these purposes, there is no necessity of accepting *samavāya* as a relation due to serving its purpose by *paryāpti*.

The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas have accepted *samavāya* or inherence as a relation, which persists between a part and whole (*avayava-avayavī*), universal and individual (*jāti-vyakti*), action and locus of action (*kriyā-kriyāvān*), attribute and the locus of attribute (*guṇa-guṇī*) etc. This relation is inseparable (*ayutasiddha*), one and eternal. In these cases, the relation of *samavāya* may be replaced by *paryāpti*. If it is done, there is logical problem. For, *guṇa* remains pervadingly in substance or *dravya*, *jāti* is the same with *vyakti* and so on.⁹

If there is a close observation, it will be seen that *samavāya* and *paryāpti* are different in concepts and hence they have to be treated differently. This is evidenced from the statement of Raghunatha - “*paryāptiśca ayam eko ghaṭaḥ imau dvau iti pratītiśākṣikaḥ svarūpa-sambandha-viśeṣaḥ.*”¹⁰ From the utterance of the sentences - ‘This is one pot’ (*ayameko ghaṭaḥ*) and ‘These are two pots’ (*imau dvau ghaṭau*), we do not get the same type of expression. The former says that jarness completely exists even in one jar and the latter expresses that the property of number two (*dvitva*) completely pervades in two jars simultaneously.

Jagadīśa has clarified the above distinction between two i.e., *samavāya* and *paryāpti* in the following manner. When it is said- ‘This is one jar’ (*ayameko ghaṭaḥ*), it signifies that the pervasion of the property ‘jarness’ (*ghaṭatva*) existing only in one jar being limited by the property existing in only one jar (*‘eka-mātra-vṛtti-dharmatāvachhedena’*). If it is said – ‘*imau dvau iti*’ (‘These are two’), it will signify that the complete pervasion of ‘bothness’ (*ubhayatva*) in both the jars being limited by the property of existing even in both (*ubhaya-mātra-vṛtti-dharmāvachhedena dvitvasya paryāptim darśitum*). If the relation of *paryāpti* is not admitted then it would have been difficult to know the distinction of two types of cognition mentioned above (*‘anyathā dvau dvitavān iti pratītayoh aviśeṣa-prasangāt iti bhāvaḥ’*).¹¹

In a single jar or *ghaṭa* there is a property called *tadghaṭatva* (particular jarness) which is the determinant of the pervasion of jarness (*paryāpti*) in a jar. On the other hand, the property of *dvitva* or *ubhayatva* is the determinant of the pervasion of *ubhayatva* (*paryāpti*) in both the pots. Had such relation not been admitted, it would be difficult for to distinguish between two cognitions- ‘This jar is possessing the duality’ (*ayam ghaṭaḥ dvitvavān*) and ‘These two jars are having duality’ (*imau ghaṭau dvitvavantau*). The former cognition reflects that ‘this pot is having number two as its quality or it is the locus of number two while the latter indicates that these two pots have possessed the number two collectively or simultaneously on account of the fact that *dvitva* is the property remaining in a different locus (*vyāsajya-vṛtti-dharma*).

It may be argued that the relation of *paryāpti* is not at all essential due to its fulfilment of purpose by *samavāya*. In the following case- ‘This is one jar’, the relation of *paryāpti* is not at all essential on account of the fact that the jarness exists in a jar through *samavāya* and also *ekatva* remains in the same through *samavāya* also. Hence, there is no need of admitting *paryāpti*.

In response to this, Jagadīśa remarks that the fireness and oneness completely pervade their locus limited by this-ness, but not the two-ness. On the other hand, the number two cannot exist in a single sufficiently due to having *vyāsajya-vṛtti* character (character remaining in two simultaneously). As number one and oneness remain sufficiently or pervadingly remains in one locus as per our experience, we cannot deny *paryāpti* over and above *samavāya*.¹²

It may be argued that there is no need of admitting *paryāpti* in the case-This is one jar on account of the fact that the property jarness exists in a jar through the relation of *samavāya* and also the property oneness (*ekatva*) exists in the same through the *samavāya*.

If *paryāpti* is not admitted in such case, the expressions like ‘The jar limited by thisness is fully or completely pervaded by jarness and oneness, but not with two-ness’ (*idamtvāvachhinne eva vahnitvamekatvaṁ ca paryāptam na tu dvitvam*) would not be possible. In other words, fireness and oneness completely pervade this jar, their locus, limited by this-ness, but not with the property two-ness. One locus is capable of pervading number two or the property two-ness completely due to its *vyāsajya-vṛtti* character i.e., having different locus simultaneously. That is why, the experience of pervadedness between jarness and oneness in a single locus can never be denied and hence, one cannot deny the necessity of admitting *paryāpti* relation keeping *samavāya* apart. Though apparent it seems that *samavāya* and *paryāpti* is one and the same yet the expression or particular cognition received by an individual is somehow different. There is a difference between ‘two properties inhering (*samaveta*) inseparably (*ayutasiddha*) in a particular locus’ and ‘two properties pervadingly exists (*paryāpta*) in one locus’.

In the expression - ‘*Tatra nīlo ghaṭo nāsti*’ i.e., ‘there is no blue jar’ which may be understood in a different way - ‘*Tatra nīlaghaṭābhāvaḥ asti*’, the counterpositive of the absence *nīlaghaṭābhāvaḥ* is *nīlaghaṭa*, the limiter of this counterpositiveness is both *nīlatva* and *ghaṭatva*. Neither *nīlatva* alone nor *ghaṭatva* alone can be the limiter of the counterpositiveness of the absence alone, but they can collectively become the limiter, which ultimately means that the counterpositiveness of the absence simultaneously exists in the *nīlatva* and *ghaṭatva*. The limiter of the counterpositiveness (*pratiyogitāvachhedaka*) neither exists isolately in *nīlatva* nor in *ghaṭatva*, but it exists pervadingly in both *nīlatva* and *ghaṭatva*. For this reason, it is absolutely necessary to admit a relation called *paryāpti*.

Again, *paryāpti* may be described as determined by subjunctness limited by oneness (*ekatvāvachhinna-anuyogitā-nirūpikā*). If there is the instance-*ghaṭo nāsti*, *ghaṭa* is the counterpositiveness (*pratiyogī*) and *ghaṭatva* is the *avachhedaka* of the counterpositive. It, otherwisely, indicates the limiter of the counterpositiveness of a jar (*ghaṭābhāvīya-pratiyogitā-avachhedaka*) lies in the *ghaṭatva* only through the relation of *paryāpti*. In the like manner, when *dvitva* or property existing simultaneously in two loci, it is connected with *paryāpti* relation, which has more than one entity as its locus. In this context, the subjunct or *anuyogī* of the *paryāpti* will be the loci of *dvitva* (twoness). The subjunctness (*anuyogitā*) of this relation existing in these loci will be limited by the property of *anyataratva* (either-ness), which exists in all the loci simultaneously. It is technically called *anyataratva-avachhinna-anuyogitā-nirūpikā paryāpti*.

In the context of the property existing different loci (*vyāsajya-vṛtti-dharma*) like *tritva* (three-ness) etc., the limiter of the subjunctness (*anuyogitāvachhedaka*) will be *anyatamatva* (being one as the property among many). Such subjunctness or *anuyogitā* is the describer of *paryāpti*.¹³

In short, it can be said that a property existing in many loci simultaneously (*vyāsajya-vṛtti-dharma*) remains completely in the totality but not in its constituents. The property *dvitva* or two-ness exists only in a jar and a cloth in the expression-*imau ghaṭa-paṭau* (‘These are jar and pot), but not in either in a jar or a cloth alone leading to the impossibility of the expression *ayam ghaṭau* (This are two pots).

References

1. “Paryāptiḥ paryavasānam, sākalyena sambandhaḥ. Arthāt yasya yāvantaḥ āśrayāḥ santi tāvasvevāśrayeṣu militeṣveva sambandhaḥ.”

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2. Guha, D.C. *Navya-Nyāya System of Logic*. 2nd Ed.1979. New Delhi: Motilal Banarasidas, 1968. p. 90.
3. *Navya-Nyāya-Bhāṣā-Pradīpaḥ*, p.21.
4. “Paryāpti-sambandhena dvitva-saṁkhyā-militayoreva dvayorvartate na tvekaikasmin dvayorva.” Ibid, p. 21.
5. Jha, V.N. “The Paryāpti Relation in Navya-Nyāya.” *Relations in Indian Philosophy*. Ed. Jha, V.N. Delhi: Sri Satguru Publications, 1992. pp. 50-51.
6. “Ataeva dvitvādayaḥ saṁkhyā vyāsajyavṛttayaḥ (vyāsajya sarvamevādhāramadhikṛtya varttante) ityucyate.” *Navya-Nyāya-Bhāṣā-Pradīpaḥ*, p. 21.
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7. Jha, V.N. “The Paryāpti Relation in Navya-Nyāya.” *Relations in Indian Philosophy*. Ed. Jha, V.N. Delhi: Sri Satguru Publications, 1992. pp. 52-54.
8. “Dviśabdasya paryāpti-sambandhena dvitvādhāratapratīteḥ ekasya ca paryāpti-sambandhena dvitvādhāratvābhāvāt ‘ayam na dvau ‘iti pratītiḥ bhavati. Samavāyasambandhena punaḥ dvitva-saṁkhyā dvayorekasminnapi tiṣṭhatīti samavāyasambandhena dvitvāśraya ityarthamabhipretya ‘dvitvavān’ iti prayogaḥ.” *Navya-Nyāya-Bhāṣā-Pradīpaḥ*, p. 21.
9. “Avayavāvayavinoh jātivyaktyoḥ guṇaguṇinoḥ kriyākriyāvatoḥ nityadravya-viśeṣayośca yaḥ sambandhaḥ sa samavāyaḥ.”- *Siddhāntamuktāvalī* on *Bhāṣāparichheda*, kārikā no.11. Panchanan Bhattacharya, Bengali Trans. Third Edition, Kanthi, Midnapore, 1374. (B.S. i.e., Bengali Samvat).
10. Vāmācarāṇa, Bhaṭṭācārya. *Avachhedakatvanirukti* with *Vivṛti*, Varanasi: Master Kheladilal and Sons, 1968. p. 38
11. “Tataśca ayam na dvau kintu dvitvavān’ iti vākyasya, ‘ayam na paryāptisambandhena dvitvavān, kintu samavāyasambandhena dvitvavān.” *Navya-Nyāya-Bhāṣā-Pradīpaḥ*, p. 21.
12. Jha, V.N. “The Paryāpti Relation in Navya-Nyāya”. *Relations in Indian Philosophy*. Ed. Jha, V.N. Delhi: Sri Satguru Publications, 1992. pp. 55-56.
13. Ibid, pp. 56-58.