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Critiquing Anscombe's Critiques of Kant

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Abstract

This paper critiques G.E.M. Anscombe's critiques of Immanuel Kant, particularly in relation to moral psychology, the concept of good will, and the categorical imperative. Anscombe in her essay *Modern Moral Philosophy*, argues that Kant's moral framework fails to offer a satisfactory guide for *moral action*, *human flourishing* and overlooks the importance of *ends* or outcomes in ethical decision-making. Contrary to this, the paper argues that Kantian ethics, with its emphasis on *goodwill*—the *intention* to act out of *duty* and respect for the *moral law*—incorporates a psychological dimension into *moral action*. The paper concludes by demonstrating the coherence and relevance of Kant's ethical system, particularly through the role of good will, in addressing Anscombe's concerns about moral psychology, the categorical imperative, and the significance of ends in moral reasoning.

Keywords: Immanuel Kant, Ethics, Categorical Imperative, Good Will, Moral Psychology, Duty, Human Flourishing, Ends, Moral Law.

Anscombe's critiques

G.E.M. Anscombe's critique of Immanuel Kant in Modern Moral Philosophy (1958) is part of her broader attack on the foundations of modern moral theory. Her criticism of Kant arises in the context of her rejection of the dominance of consequentialist and deontological approaches in contemporary ethical theory. In this essay, she seeks to revive an Aristotelian virtue-based ethics and dismisses *modern moral philosophy*[1] (Anscombe) for what she sees as fundamental conceptual errors.

The first point Anscombe makes in her critique is that modern moral philosophy, including Kant's, operates within a framework of *moral laws* without grounding them in a divine or human lawgiver. She argues that this concept of law is incoherent without a lawgiver, and modern moral philosophy has inherited this flawed notion from the theological traditions that linked moral laws to divine command. Anscombe criticizes Kant for continuing to use the language of obligation and duty without this essential connection. She argues, "It is as if the notion 'criminal' were to remain when criminal law and criminal courts had been

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abolished and forgotten" (Anscombe 6). By this, she suggests that Kant's use of terms like "duty" and "moral law" lacks proper foundation, as it detaches these ideas from the theological roots that gave them meaning.

Anscombe specifically targets Kant's categorical imperative, which she believes fails to provide a satisfactory guide for moral action. According to her, the idea that one can derive moral obligations solely from the formal structure of universalizability (the idea that one should act only on maxims that can be universally willed) is inadequate. She argues that such formalism does not sufficiently consider the complexity of human actions, intentions, and virtues. In particular, she contends that Kant's system is too focused on abstract rules and neglects the importance of virtues and practical wisdom in ethical life (9-10). She is concerned that Kantian ethics treats moral obligations as fixed rules that apply universally, without properly addressing the particularities of human experience and the role of moral character.

Further, Anscombe criticizes not just Kant, but the entire tradition of modern moral philosophy for employing concepts like "moral obligation" and "ought" in ways she finds unintelligible. She traces the problem back to the rejection of a teleological, Aristotelian conception of ethics, which connected morality with human flourishing. Kant, in her view, is emblematic of the modern turn away from this Aristotelian tradition, as he replaces the idea of moral ends (the good life) with an abstract sense of duty. She argues that this shift has led to an impoverished understanding of ethics, one that cannot properly explain why certain actions are right or wrong (3).

Hence, the three principal reasons of Anscombe's dissatisfaction particularly with Kantian deontology are: *firstly*, that we the moderns have no adequate grounding with psychology which deals with human nature. One of the contentions of Anscombe is that an adequate understanding of human psychology is a pre-condition of doing moral philosophy, i.e. deciding about what is right or what is good for man. In the larger context our 'conspicuous lack', to use Anscombe's words, of adequate understanding of human nature is a result of the way our understanding of ourselves have been shaped during the period of modernity.

The *second reason*, according to Anscombe, is that despite intricate theorizing, deontology could not integrate the notions of right and obligation in our thinking about substantial moral issues. For, these notions are very formal and their use in moral thinking presupposes one's acquaintance with the corresponding theory and its assumptions. Therefore, the concepts of moral obligation and moral duty are to be jettisoned. The *third reason* given by Anscombe is in relation to the history of British moral philosophy, especially of the intuitionist moral philosophy that was quite influential in the late 18th and early 19th Century. The entire spell of the intuitionist philosophers like Sidgwick, Moore, Ross and Prichard, according to Anscombe, was quite uninteresting.

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Anscombe's dissatisfaction with Kant is for reducing norms of action to a moral law, i.e. categorical imperative. In particular, Kant is charged for introducing moral legalism without pre-supposing 'a divine law-giver and for introducing a legalistic model of self legislation.

Analysis of Categorical Imperative

The analysis of Kant's categorical imperative addresses many of Anscombe's critiques by offering a deeper understanding of its structure and application. While Anscombe argues that the categorical imperative fails to provide a satisfactory guide for moral action, a closer examination reveals how it integrates intentions, moral law, and respect for persons in ways that respond to her concerns. Kant's categorical imperative is often seen as purely formal, but it also incorporates a psychological dimension through its emphasis on acting out of respect for the moral law. Kant stresses that moral actions are driven by the intention to follow duty, not merely the rules themselves. This focus on intention connects to human psychology by recognizing that moral actions stem from an inner commitment to duty, offering a framework for understanding moral motives without requiring a divine lawgiver.

Kant in his preface to *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals* makes it clear that his purpose is to set out the ultimate moral norm and defends its ability to obligate us.[2] (Sullivan 28) In Kant's political theory the relations between persons in the state of nature and even within civil society are marked by discord arising out of conflicting desires. This strife has its counterpart within each individual, in our experience of internal moral conflict between our reason and our desires. We may not want to obey the moral law; we may also have desires we would prefer to satisfy. For this reason, all moral laws appear to us as imperatives. Moreover, because nothing can justify disregarding our moral obligations, they obligate us absolutely, or categorically. Consequently, in the foundations Kant called the ultimate moral norm the categorical imperative. (28) For Kant moral imperative must be categorical. That is, it must command actions, not as means to any end, but as good in themselves. Kant claims, the categorical imperative, which declares an action to be objectively necessary in it without reference to any purpose, that is, without any other end, is valid as an apodictic practical principle.[3] (Edgar 292)

The expression "categorical imperative" primarily refers to an obligation to do actions of a certain kind. As a formula of categorical imperative, however, it is an obligation which tells us to choose among the maxims by a certain criterion. In other words it is an unconditional command for an action and represents objective necessity without reference to any end. As a command of morality, it is binding on all rational beings as a law which must be obeyed and followed even in opposition to inclinations. Making a distinction between the two kinds of imperatives, Kant says that when one conceives of a hypothetical imperative

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he/she does not know what it will contain until one is given the conditional clause, the statement of the end aimed at. But when one conceives of a categorical imperative, he/she knows at once what it contains. It contains only the law and the necessity that the maxim-the subjective principle of action-shall conform to the law. There is no other condition restricting the law and therefore, it is categorical.

What is then categorical imperative? We can talk about it purely a priori, that is, by considering the mere concept of a categorical imperative, is that it commands conformity to law in general. There is therefore but one categorical imperative, namely; act only on that maxim whereby through which you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law.[4] (Rooney 555) Kant immediately present these as another formulation of the imperatives namely to act as if the maxim of your action were to become by they will a universal law of nature.[5] (Hoebel 782) Now if all the imperatives of duty can be deduced from this one imperative as from their principle, then, although it should remain undecided whether what is called duty is merely a vain notion, yet at least we shall be able to show what we can understand by it and what this notion means. If we make any exception in this universal moral principle that become immoral, the practical reason commands us to rise above selfish desires and maxims, which clash with the universality of the law.

While Anscombe criticizes deontology for failing to integrate notions of right and obligation into moral life, Kant's system provides a method for determining moral obligations based on universalizability. The categorical imperative requires individuals to consider whether their actions can be consistently willed as universal laws, thereby rooting moral obligation in rational consistency. This framework links duty and obligation to rational deliberation and respects the autonomy of moral agents, thus making these concepts more meaningful and accessible than Anscombe suggests.

An imperative results from a maxim, on which, in turn, a subject acts, telling us how one ought to act.[6] (Lewis 30) At a particular time, an agent necessarily acts upon a particular principle, and it is called a subjective maxim, although it does not mean that by this principle the agent seeks to fulfill his or her desires. A maxim is only a personal “rule of life” or a “general policy” of action or even a “philosophy of life,” as a human person cannot involve in conscious actions without some sort of guidance. It is evident that at a general level, it is the maxim that gives direction to the conscious action of an individual.

Anscombe argues that Kantian ethics neglects virtues and the particularities of human experience, focusing instead on abstract rules. However, the categorical imperative, especially in its “humanity formulation” (treating others as ends in themselves), can be seen as addressing these concerns. It emphasizes the moral worth of individuals and demands that actions respect the dignity and autonomy of others, fostering a moral attitude that is deeply concerned with the concrete

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realities of human relationships and the development of moral character.

The moral law is a rule of action for all rational beings, and its fulfillment is said to be spontaneous or natural for all those beings that are fully rational. The human species being partially rational, that is affected both by rationality and sensuality, does not perfectly fulfill the moral law, and in its case the latter takes the form of an imperative. Thus the categorical imperative is a moral principle for us humans, the fulfillment of which is independent of and unconditioned by anything whatsoever. As Kant holds in the groundwork it presents itself as an obligatory constraint on us, whose will, in the wake of our inclinations, is not necessarily determined by the pure principle of morality; a categorical imperative would be one which represented an action as objectively necessary in itself apart from its relation to a further end.[7] (82) It simply means that a categorical imperative is independent of it.[8] (34)

Incorporating the necessary and universal characteristics of the categorical imperative Kant has expressed the principle as follows: act on the maxim which can at the same time be made a universal law. (Paton 104) It is with this principle that Kant can deal with those moral obligations deriving from the categorical imperative. His statement that the law concerning punishment is a categorical imperative…[9] (100) indicates that it makes an unconditional moral demand and that it can be derived from any one of the formulations of the categorical imperative.

So our finding on categorical imperative would say that it is categorical since it holds absolutely and without qualification. It is imperative since it is a command that ought to be obeyed. The categorical imperative is rational, since it is apprehended intuitively by the reason and is logically consistent; it is a priori, since it can be known in advance to apply to every possible problem that may arise in experience. The moral law is a priori and indicates what ought to be done under all circumstances. To do one's duty is a categorical imperative, that is rational and a priori, one ought to do one's duty under all circumstances whatsoever; this is intuitively evident to reason.

It is the objective law of reason and the source of all moral commands having as its characteristics universality and necessity. It should be applied universally, unconditionally to all agents, independently of their empirical interest. In Kantian sense, only those commandments, which have got their source in reason, is genuine imperative. The categorical imperative is a moral principle for all human being. Its fulfillment is independent of and unconditioned by anything whatsoever. In this way, Kant's categorical imperative, when fully analyzed, responds to Anscombe's critiques by demonstrating that it is not merely an abstract rule-based system but a moral framework deeply concerned with human motives, autonomy, and respect for others. This coherence between duty, moral psychology, and practical moral life shows how Kant's ethics can meet Anscombe's dissatisfaction with deontology. Kant's deontological ethics,

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particularly through the concept of good will, provides a framework that incorporates moral psychology and addresses concerns about ends and human flourishing, contrary to G.E.M. Anscombe's criticisms.

Good will as the source of morality

What does Kant mean by the good will? This issue forms one of the major topics of interpreting Kant's text. He refers in the first place to will which is good in itself and not merely in relation to something else. We may say for example, of a painful surgerical treatment that is good, not in itself, but in relation to bring about good. But Kantian concept of good will is the concept of a will, which is good in itself. A good will is good not because of what it performs or effects, not by its aptness for the attainment of some proposed end, but simply by virtue of volition. The intentional action of the good will, though it does not derive its worth from what it aims at or the ends that it realizes, has of necessity certain ends whenever it is involved in willing. A goodwill is good not because of what it performs or effects not by its aptness for the attainment of some proposed end, but simply by virtue of the volition, that is it is good in itself and considered by itself is to be esteemed much higher than all that can be brought about by it in favour of any inclination, even of the sum total of all inclinations.[10] (Dev 394) Good will has its own value. Irrespective of its usefulness or uselessness it is still valuable. Reason reigns supreme over our will. Kant affirms it by way of saying that a good will is good not… through its willing alone- that is, good in itself. (Paton 62)

The moral worth of an action does not lie in the effect expected from it, and so too does not depend on any principle of action that needs to borrow its motive form the expected result. (69) So, for Kant, the source of a moral action is nothing but the good will, which has universal application in the practical realm. The ground of the subjective determination of the will is said to be an end, the realization of which is necessarily regulated by certain laws.

The will is conceived as a power of determining oneself to action in accordance with the idea of certain laws. And such a power can be found only in rational beings. (95) These laws have to be those that do not result from any inclination and, thus, nothing which rests on the production of something in the natural world. For Kant, that which exclusively determines the will is objectively the law and subjectively pure respect for this practical law… (68) Kant explains the rational nature of will in the following way:

Everything in nature works in accordance with laws. Only a rational being has the power to act in accordance with his ideas of law- that is, in accordance with principles- and only so has he a will. Since reason is required in order to derive actions from laws, the will is nothing but practical reason. (80) Persons who make use of cultivated reason for the enjoyments of life will not be truly satisfied and this leads to hatred and tension. Reason is not present for the achievement of happiness but it is directed towards some nobler ends and therefore the

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individual ends of man must be postponed. Reason controls our will. The goodwill is a means which helps persons to reach rational ends. Reason's highest vocation is the establishment of goodwill. Reason alone is capable of knowing the essential relation between means and ends. Human beings have not only the faculty of reason but they are motivated into action also by inclinations, and hence, the will need not always act according to the laws of practical reason. The will, then, is the power to choose only that which reason independently of inclination recognizes to be practically necessary, that is, to be good.

Goodwill is present when volition and conduct spring, not from fear or inclination, but from the consciousness of duty. Control of emotions, self-discipline and reflection all these together form a person's worth. With these, there must be good will present otherwise they may become highly evil. The goodness that is aimed at by the practical reason, then, has its source in the good will, as it is the only good which is good by itself. It also means that in any given circumstances it must be the "highest good," and, hence, must be an absolute or an unconditioned good, in the sense of being the condition for all the rest. (61)

Kant's emphasis on the good will as the only unconditionally good thing highlights the psychological dimension of moral action. For Kant, the moral worth of an action is not derived from its consequences but from the intention behind it. The good will is not motivated by inclinations, emotions, or personal desires but by the rational recognition of duty. This focus on the will's intentionality—acting purely out of duty—places moral psychology at the heart of his ethical system. The ability to act from duty requires a kind of self-discipline and rational self-regulation, essential elements of moral psychology, aligning internal motivations with moral laws. Thus, Kant's framework does not ignore the psychological processes that guide moral action but emphasizes that morality begins in the mind, with rational reflection on duty and moral law. In this way, moral psychology is embedded in his deontology through the primacy of reason and the regulation of desires and inclinations.

Kant's insistence on the intrinsic worth of the good will is said to be reflected in the contention that the will acts from a motive of duty, which is considered to be the highest order desire. So, the sole motive of the good will is to do its duty only for the sake of doing its duty; in other words, what it intends to do, it intends because it is its duty, and it does it despite certain subjective limitations and obstacles. (65) To make clear the concept of good, Kant turns his attention to the concept of duty. A will that acts for the sake of duty is a good will. With regard to God, who has a good will, it will be absurd to speak of God performing his duty. For the concept of duty or obligation involves the concept of self-conquest, of having to overcome obstacles. And the divine will is not conceived as subject to any possible hindrance in willing that is good. So we cannot say that good will is the one which acts for the sake of duty we can say that a will which acts for the sake of duty is a good will. Kant gives a special name to the will of God that is the 'Holy Will.'

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The idea of respecting every rational will as an end in itself and not treating it as a mere means to the attainment of the objects of one's own desires lead us on to the idea that every rational will as a will which makes universal laws. In Kant's view, the will of man considered as a rational being must be regarded as the source of the law, which he recognizes as universally binding. This is the principle of autonomy. Any natural process which governs my action confers on me the unfreedom of its causes. If my action is called unfree or determined it is because there is a sense in which it is not truly mine. An action that originates in me can be attributed only to me and is therefore in a real sense mine. Here in such cases I am free. Whenever I act I am free and unfree where some other agencies act through me.

Human actions are considered to be worthy of our humanity only when they are performed according the objective moral demands of a given situation, in which the role of moral motive is of vital importance. In this process it is necessary that our wills be submitted to rules so as to bring all our voluntary actions into harmony in a universally valid manner. Such a rule, which forms the first principle of the possibility of the harmony of a free will is the moral rule,[11] (17) says Kant in his Lectures on Ethics. This moral law, along with freedom, is the keystone of the whole system of pure reason. (Lewis 8) Kant argues, our actions must be regulated if they are to harmonize, and their regulation is effected by the moral law. (17)

Kant's concept of the good will directly responds to Anscombe's criticism by emphasizing that the moral worth of an action is not grounded in consequences or personal inclinations but in the intentional adherence to duty, guided by practical reason. Kant's good will is good in itself because it is motivated by respect for the moral law, not by external outcomes. This focus on internal motivation aligns with the view that morality is about cultivating the right disposition, one that acts from duty rather than from self-interest or emotion. Therefore, Kant's framework does not overlook practical wisdom but integrates it by making moral law the foundation of ethical action, ensuring that moral agents are guided by reason rather than personal desires.

Anscombe also criticizes modern moral philosophy for relying on concepts like "duty" and "obligation" without sufficient grounding in virtue ethics. However, Kant's account of the good will and the autonomy of moral agents provide a robust response. For Kant, acting from duty is a rational exercise of freedom, where the moral agent acts in accordance with universal principles of reason, rather than being swayed by contingent emotions or social expectations. This autonomy enables the moral agent to create harmony between individual action and universal moral law. Thus, while Anscombe advocates for a return to virtue ethics, Kant's ethics offers a systematic approach where the cultivation of the good will through rational reflection and adherence to moral law leads to virtuous and morally worthy actions.

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Critiquing Anscombe's Critiques of Kant

Onora O'Neill has argued against G.E.M. Anscombe's critique of modern moral theories, including Kantian ethics. O'Neill defends Kantian ethics from criticisms like those of Anscombe by emphasizing the flexibility and practical applicability of Kant's moral framework, particularly in relation to duty, practical reason, and moral psychology.

In defense of universalizability and moral psychology, O'Neill argues that Kantian ethics is not as disconnected from moral psychology as Anscombe claimed. According to O'Neill, Kant's concept of universalizability, through the categorical imperative, is not a rigid rule-based system but one that demands moral agents to consider others' perspectives. Kantian ethics requires that agents act on maxims that they could will to become universal laws, which inherently demands an understanding of human motives and interpersonal relationships[12] (O'Neill 3-4). This, she argues, involves psychological insight into how agents reason about moral situations, contrary to Anscombe's charge that Kant ignores moral psychology. All rational actions are said to be goal-directed, and this is all the more so with regard to the conscious adoption of a maxim, which has an interest in the end of that action. (18) Therefore, Kant calls all our maxims "material rules" in the sense that "every maxim contains an end." So we can say that every maxim representing an action represents an end, and if the action is done from a prudential maxim, it would represent an action as a means to an effect. On the contrary if the action is done from a moral maxim, it would represent a possible action good in itself without reference to any further end. (Lewis 18) Moreover, a maxim contains an ought and, thus, a principle of action necessitating the will and, hence, is said to be applied universally. The necessitating ought contained in a law of action is expressed in an imperative, a command. An imperative is a proposition that expresses a possible free action by which a certain end is to be attained. It is a command of reason which constrains or necessitates a will and is thus considered to be an objective principle. (Paton 81) and practical rule of action. An imperative is a practical rule which makes necessary an action that is in itself contingent. An imperative differs from a practical law in that a law, when it states that an action is necessary, takes no account of whether the action is also subjectively necessary on the agents' part or whether the action is in itself contingent. If the action is subjectively necessary there is no imperative. Hence an imperative is a rule which makes a subjectively contingent action necessary and thus shows that the agent is one who must be necessitated to conform with this rule.[13] (20-21)

While Anscombe criticizes Kant for placing too much emphasis on duty at the expense of virtue and human flourishing, O'Neill argues that Kantian ethics is deeply concerned with human well-being and the autonomy of rational agents. O'Neill points out that Kant's conception of duty is rooted in respect for persons, and his notion of autonomy allows individuals to pursue their ends as long as those ends respect the moral law. O'Neill emphasizes that the categorical

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imperative supports a framework for moral decisions that safeguard human dignity and flourishing, though not in the Aristotelian sense of virtue (115-117).

O'Neill also counters Anscombe's criticism that Kantian ethics lacks concern for ends or outcomes. She explains that Kant's emphasis on ends in themselves, especially in his formulation of the categorical imperative, means that human beings should always be treated as ends and not merely as means to other ends. This formulation implies that moral actions must respect the autonomy and inherent worth of persons, which is a form of practical reasoning directed toward good outcomes, particularly the protection of human dignity (48-49). Thus, Kantian ethics does incorporate a consideration of ends, but in a way that aligns with moral law rather than being driven by particular goals or consequences. Kant contend that there is no inherent conflict between his emphasis on duty and the concept of human flourishing. Rather, he could argue that acting from duty is a necessary condition for genuine human flourishing. For Kant, a moral action is one that is not driven by subjective desires or the pursuit of personal happiness, but by a commitment to treating others as autonomous rational beings. By acting from duty, individuals contribute to a moral community where each person is treated as an end in themselves. In such a society, Kant would claim, human flourishing naturally follows, as it is grounded in the respect for autonomy and moral worth. Thus, flourishing is not opposed to Kant's ethics; rather, it emerges from the moral relationships that duty sustains.

O'Neill defends Kantian ethics against Anscombe's critique by emphasizing that Kant's framework is not a rigid system detached from human psychology, but rather one that integrates practical reasoning, respect for human dignity, and the moral consideration of others' perspectives.

Conclusion

Anscombe's criticism of Kant in Modern Moral Philosophy is part of her broader critique of modern moral theories that focus on rules and duties at the expense of human virtues and practical reasoning. She argues that the Kantian project, by attempting to establish moral principles through pure reason and universalizability, neglects essential aspects of moral life, such as the development of good character and the context of moral actions. Her critique paved the way for a revival of Aristotelian virtue ethics and influenced later philosophers to reconsider the importance of moral psychology, intention, and practical reasoning in ethical theory. Kant in his ethical framework already places significant emphasis on the role of intentions. In his system, the moral worth of an action is not determined by its consequences or external factors, but by the agent's motive, particularly the intention to act out of respect for the moral law. For Kant, the central question is whether the individual acts from duty, which involves a rational commitment to the moral law, rather than from personal inclinations or desires. Therefore, Kant would argue that his ethics incorporates the psychological dimension of moral action, particularly by

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grounding moral worth in the intention to fulfill one's duty. The psychological aspect is not ignored but is framed around the agent's moral motive, which is essential to his concept of autonomy and rationality.

In response to the critique that Kantian deontology de-emphasizes ends, his ethical system in fact accommodate ends, but within a specific framework. The ultimate end in Kantian ethics is the realization of the "kingdom of ends," a community in which all rational agents act in accordance with universal moral laws and treat one another as ends in themselves, not merely as means. While Kant emphasizes the categorical imperative and duty, he does not reject practical ends like happiness or personal goals. Instead, he argues that these ends must be pursued in ways that respect the autonomy and dignity of all individuals. Thus, practical ends are not ruled out, but they must align with the moral law. The kingdom of ends serves as a vision for a moral society in which personal and collective flourishing are possible within the bounds of mutual respect and universal moral principles. While Anscombe argues that Kantian ethics overlooks the importance of ends or outcomes, Kant's theory, through the categorical imperative, directly addresses the ends that should guide human action. One of the formulations of the categorical imperative is the Formula of Humanity, which commands individuals to treat humanity, in themselves and others, as an end in itself, not merely as a means to some other goal. This respect for the intrinsic dignity and worth of every rational being establishes a clear moral end—the flourishing of rational beings, which is central to ethical decision-making.

By treating individuals as ends in themselves, Kant's ethics promotes human flourishing in the sense that it requires moral agents to consider the autonomy, dignity, and well-being of others in their actions. The good will, while not aiming at specific outcomes, inevitably seeks to protect and promote the conditions for human flourishing because it operates within the constraints of moral law, which demands respect for rational beings and their inherent value. Kant's idea of autonomy, the ability to act according to rational self-legislation, underscores his concern for the flourishing of rational beings. The good will is essentially the will that is governed by practical reason, free from external influences, inclinations, or consequences. This notion of autonomy respects the individual's capacity to determine their own actions based on moral law, which ultimately supports personal and collective flourishing by ensuring that individuals act in ways that promote mutual respect and cooperation.

Kant's categorical imperative also ensures human flourishing through the idea that moral actions must be based on universalizable principles. This means that every action must be capable of being applied universally without contradiction. Actions that respect the autonomy of individuals and promote fairness and justice are precisely the kinds of actions that foster a social environment conducive to human flourishing. Kant's ethical system, therefore, inherently promotes the moral ends that safeguard the dignity and well-being of all rational

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beings, ensuring that the good will leads to moral actions that benefit human life and society as a whole.

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