Analytic-Synthetic Distinction:
The Issues of Logic, Language and Meaning in Kant and Quine'S Philosophy

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Abstract

The analytic-synthetic[1] distinction is one of the controversial and also essential issues to understand many developments in logic, philosophy of language, epistemology and metaphysics in contemporary philosophy. This paper examines the discussion on analytic-synthetic distinction in Kant and Quine's philosophy with the aim of placing exactly what is at stake. In the course of this discussion, I will try to make analyse their arguments that what exactly analytic-synthetic distinction claims and by doing so assess the so-called alikenesses between them. In the *Critique of Pure Reason*[2] Kant says the distinction between analytic and synthetic judgements in three distinct ways: analytic judgements are those (1) 'in which [...] the predicate B belongs to the subject A, as something which is (covertly) contained in this concept A', instantly pursuing this we are acquainted that analytic judgements are those (2) 'in which the connection of predicate with the subject is thought through identity', the distinction between analytic and synthetic judgements can be added by the concept that (3) '[Analytic judgements], adding nothing through the predicate to the concept of the subject […] can also be entitled explicative. From another point of view in the synthetic judgements, the predicate lies outside the subject concept. It adds something new to the subject concept. It gives new information about the subject term'. Quine appraises Kant as the one who first amply showed the importance of the analytic-synthetic distinction and engaged with the predicaments in Kant's position to re-conceptualise the whole relationship between logic, language and meaning. His famous objections to analyticity in 'Two Dogmas of Empiricism'[3] asserts that a **"**fundamental cleavage between truths which are analytic*,* or grounded in meanings, independently of matters of fact, and truths which are synthetic*,* or grounded in fact," is an essential dogma of modem empiricism. After examining the presumptions, the paper concludes that the disagreement between Kant and Quine's different approaches on the notion of analyticity-synthetic distinction is rooted against the traditional philosophy. In Kant's philosophy the distinction between analytic-synthetic is not only important for the renunciation of traditional approaches of the so-called dogmatic,

metaphysics, but it is also important in his inquiry into the possibility of metaphysics as a rational science. Quine accepted a radical naturalization of philosophy, such that philosophy would be continuous with empirical science, as its slightly more abstract and reflective branch. His attack on analytic-synthetic distinction and conceptual analysis has also had an inadvertent, and somewhat ironic and opened the door to a new wave of metaphysical theorizing by opposing the stand of Logical Positivism, which considered metaphysical inquiries as nonsensical. But as we will see, the way the distinction between analytic and synthetic judgments operates within these worthy forms out to differ substantially between Kant and Quine.

Keywords: Analytic-synthetic; Science; Logic; Locke; Berkeley; Hume; Kant; Frege; Quine

I

As everyone knows, Kant articulated his epistemological pursuance in terms of justifying the possibility of synthetic a priori knowledge. The fundamental problem for Kant is the problem of knowledge: What is knowledge, how is it possible? Kant does not concern with the "if," but with the "how" of knowledge. He does not ask: "if knowledge is possible," but he asks "how it is possible." Knowledge does not consist in unconnected ideas, knowledge is the connection of ideas, i.e. judgment. An idea like that of snow, white or man cannot, by itself, constitute knowledge proper. It must be combined with some other idea in the form of a judgment in order that there may be knowledge. For instance, in the judgment, 'the earth is a planet', the idea 'planet' has been combined with the idea 'the earth', i.e., the judgement establishes a relation between these two ideas. Knowledge, according to Kant, consists in such relationships existing between ideas in the form of judgments. It comes out in the form of judgments in which something is asserted or repudiated. Thus, when we connect the ideas of 'snow' and 'white', i.e., when we judge that 'snow' is 'white', we have knowledge. But every judgment does not amount to knowledge. Judgments are of two kinds-analytic and synthetic. An analytic judgment only unfolds the connotation of the subject and gives us no new information. Such a judgment, therefore, is not knowledge. It is synthetic judgment that alone amounts to knowledge, for it does not simply state the connotation of the subject term, but gives us some new information. But all synthetic judgments again-do not amount to knowledge. knowledge in order to be worthy of the name, must be universal and necessary. Hence it is only the universal and necessary synthetic judgments that constitute knowledge.[4] How to know that a synthetical judgment is universal and necessary? Is it experience? No, says Kant. Experience confines our observation to a limited number of cases. Therefore, it cannot yield universality and necessity. The only synthetical judgements which give us such knowledge cannot be derived from experience alone, but on reason too; and this is the same as saying that such a judgment must be a priori. Hence, in Kant's opinion a synthetical judgement a priori gives us true knowledge. Knowledge, therefore, may be defined, according to him, as a synthetic judgment a priori. Thus, the

proposition "fire burns" may be regarded as an example of synthetic judgment a priori. It is synthetic, because the element 'fire' and the element 'burning' are found to exist together in our experience; it is a priori, because the necessary, universal connection between 'fire' and 'burning' is supplied by the mind from within. The forms of knowledge are an account for the necessity, universality and the a priori nature of judgment. Kant's standpoint is that knowledge is the result of the combination of reason and sensations. The sense-impressions entering into our mind from without are first arranged in the order of space and time by a sub-faculty of reason called the sensibility and then subsumed under the twelve categories of the understanding, another sub-faculty of reason.

II

The distinction between analytic and synthetic judgments will occupy a significant episode in the history of modern philosophy, for it is on this distinction that Kant bases his whole exposition of the *Critique of Pure Reason*. The age of criticism in the history of western philosophy came with the publication of Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason* in the year 1781. In the realm of thought the change was extraordinarily radical and revolutionary. The age of criticism presupposes the prevalence of the age of reason. Criticism means criticism of reason by reason itself.[5] It is a form of self-reflection of human reason. Reason was valued and trusted and employed with minute precision in natural sciences, mathematics, epistemology and metaphysics for furtherance of the cause of knowledge. It must be assumed into discussion that the distinction between an analytic and a synthetic method was not Kant's conception. It was already dealt with by ancient mathematicians and it was commonly used by Kant's modern predecessors and contemporaries. Modern philosophy started with the Renaissance and Descartes was the proponent of this period. The search for universal and necessary knowledge, i.e., the search for certainty, inspired by Descartes to search the model of mathematical thinking. He asserted on clearness and distinctness in the area of knowledge by which the analytic method was introduced. In search of a method to arrive at self-evident simple concepts and his method of universal doubt gave him the clue to reach the most simple and clear idea that "I exist". It is an innate idea, according to Descartes. It cannot be derived from sense-experience. The idea of God, like the idea of self, is also another innate idea. The idea of substance is one such innate idea and it is identical with that of God. He realised that if knowledge has to achieve clarity, certainty, universality and necessity, it has to adopt mathematical methods for its purpose. Spinoza carried rationalism a step forward in the form of geometrical method. Like a mathematical method the geometrical method affords a logical order of the coherent system. Leibnitz, as the successor to Spinoza, was a great promoter of geometrical methods. Reason was taken to be the only source of knowledge; it gives clear and distinct knowledge. He was the first to fix the logical difference between two types of knowledge; the knowledge of reasoning, and, other is, the knowledge of fact. A proposition is apprehended to be necessary if the contradictory proposition is inconceivable. It is assumed that a

statement of fact is not necessary but contingent. Consequently, it arises that the truths of reason are founded on the law of contradiction and accordingly analytic. Thus, he distinguished analytic propositions and synthetic propositions. Christian Wolff symbolised a rationalistic thinker in the German Enlightenment. Like numerous other philosophers of the Modern period, Wolff accepted the method of mathematics, if suitably applied, could be accustomed to elaborate other areas of human knowledge. His main accomplishment was a comprehensive work on almost every learned field of his time, shown and extended according to his demonstrative-deductive, mathematical method, which maybe represents the period of Enlightenment rationality in Germany. Like Descartes, Wolff first came upon this method in mathematics, but he resolved that both mathematical and philosophical methods had their eventual causes in a 'natural logic' recommended to the human judgment by God. He is frequently looked upon as an important historical figure who associates the philosophies of Leibniz and Kant. According to Kant, in the "Preface" to the Critique of Pure Reason (2nd ed), Wolff is "the greatest of all dogmatic philosophers." The rationalist tradition in its Leibnizian and Wolffian phase logically ended in dogmatism.

The analytic-synthetic distinction has become an improvement in empiricism over the last several centuries. Empiricism, though originated with Bacon's scientific method, found its philosophical foundation in Locke and developed with Berkeley and Hume. Bacon fought against medievalism and Aristotelian syllogistic formalism and searched for a new method of knowledge. The basic character of a form of knowledge is inductive in character. Aristotle distinguishes between two senses of being and essential sense. The notion of essence and accident play important roles in pre-analytic thought and discourse. Aristotle discussed this problem in several of his treatises that some things do maintain their identity while undergoing change. The concept of essence holds a pivotal role in Aristotle's metaphysical framework. Aristotle's metaphysics centres on substance, essence, and accidents. What Bacon descends as a thought, Locke carried out it by epistemological considerations. He refuted the doctrine of innate ideas and asserted that no ideas are innate. In contrast to the mathematical method Locke calls his method is "historical plain method".[6] All concepts and even mathematical concepts are rooted in our common experience. Barkeley asserted that to dispel metaphysics and to concentrate upon human beings to common sense was his outline.[7] Berkely attempted to disclose the disadvantage of the mathematical method. He remarked that any knowledge worth its name should be based on sense-experience and mathematics is no omission to it. The mathematical deductive method ensures us of abstract formal validity and not firm material truth. He took a firm stand that mathematical methods should not be accustomed to acquire metaphysical knowledge. Metaphysics is said to be the science of super sensible, and mathematics has no capacity to give the knowledge of the super sensible. His illustrious criticism of abstract general ideas shows that he was ahead against all forms of abstraction, including mathematical abstractions. Hume acquired the clues from Berkeley, and argues that, if all our knowledge is rooted to our sense-experience, then we are not upheld either in affirming or

denying any thing which is based on experience. He ascertained that experience brings out that what we call self is only a sum total of emotions and ideas; a fluctuant flow of sensations. Self is a field of force; a dynamic stream. Mind as a substance disappeared from the internal world as a misconception. So also, the substantial identity of the external objects. Berkeley refused the so-called externality and the substantiality of the external world. Hume strictly adopting the same method refused the substantiality of the internal world too. Neither perception nor introspection can give us the "impression" of the concept of substance. The substance is only "a bundle or collection" of impressions. Hume showed that there is nothing in causal connection to universality and necessity. Related to Hume's distinction between relations of ideas and matters of fact, Kant distinguished between analytic and synthetic judgments (1929, A6–7/B10). For Kant, "Judgments of experience, as such, are one and all synthetic" (1929, B11). He too agreed that "Mathematics gives us a shining example of how far, independently of experience, we can progress in a priori knowledge" (1929, A4/B8), that is, knowledge acquired independently of experience. So far, Kant's explanation is congenial with Hume's, but Kant strongly objected to empiricism by his advanced approach of mathematical knowledge being synthetic.

Thus, empiricism proposed that all knowledge is a posteriori, i.e., it succeeds experience; whereas rationalism proposed that all knowledge is a priori, i.e., it precedes experience. The two traditions stood in mutual opposition and in distinct separate. The mathematical method followed by the rationalists is deductive. The experimental method followed by the empiricist is inductive. Rationalism resolved in dogmatism and empiricism in scepticism. For Kant empiricism is a model of scepticism. In the approach of Hume, empiricism logically closes in scepticism. Kant had appraised Hume, because it is for the statements of Hume on causality that Kant "arose from his dogmatic slumber".[8] A problem about the rationality of induction is especially striking in Hume's argumentation namely, though our specific beliefs about causal connections are evidently based not on any a priori reasoning from the concept of the cause to the idea of the effect, but on continual prior occurrence of sequences of states of affairs.[9] Kant writes "Hume is perhaps the most ingenious of all the sceptics, and beyond all question is without rivals in respect of the influence which the sceptical procedure can exercise in awakening reason to a through self-examination" (1929, A705/B793). It indicates that scepticism is an effective antidote to dogmatism and a necessary step towards awakening of criticism. The clash of these two traditions occasioned the birth of dialectic and Kant's critical philosophy dialectically resolved the conflict.

III

Willard Van Orman Quine is a leading thinker of the tradition of analytic philosophy. His initial entry into philosophy was through the discipline of mathematics. His major preoccupations as a philosopher have to do with the philosophy of language and ontology, both topics having, in his treatment, close interconnections. What he has to assert in both these extents has noticeable

similarities with the general perspective of empiricism and pragmatism philosophies. He is an empiricist in the route of Carnap, that is, a *logical* empiricist. It is, in particular, a philosophy in which First Philosophy and its metaphysical articles of faith have no legitimate place. He has made a major contribution, as an analytical philosopher and logician, towards overcoming the prevailing hostility to 'metaphysics' that pervaded analytical philosophy during the period when it was dominated by logical positivism. Like his positivist contemporaries, he concentrates that philosophy's chief assignment is to assist science in doing its task precisely. Quine endures the post-Baconian perspective that necessary for all science is successful negotiation of the observational checkpoints. Thus, Quine's mission for philosophy is to assist science in maintaining its empiricist philosophy.

Quine published his famous article, "Two Dogmas of Empiricism" (1951), which evoked one of the biggest controversies in the history of philosophy. He tries to show the different ways of making sense of the notion of analytic-synthetic distinction and indicates how each of these attempts fails. The analytic-synthetic distinction depends on a cleavage between things lying in the realm of facts, and things lying beyond the realm of facts. There is a long-standing situation, in the history of Western philosophical tradition, of truths of two kinds, viz. truths that are dependent on contingent facts of the world and truths that are not so. Truths about language and its use are known as analytic truths and truths that talk about the world are called synthetic truths. This distinction between analytic and synthetic truth is what Quine refers to as the first dogma of empiricism. He asserts that a "fundamental cleavage between truths which are *analytic,* or grounded in meanings, independently of matters of fact, and truths which are *synthetic,* or grounded in fact," is an essential dogma of modem empiricism.[10] Quine argues that all the possible endeavours to make sense of this distinction is futile. It was Kant who introduced the terminology "analytic" and "synthetic" to describe this type of cleavage. Quine disapproved of analyticity because it depends on an unempirical conception of meaning. It is central to Quine's work if only because it holds his first sustained public attack on analyticity. Quine moves further and refutes another idea associated with empiricism viz. each significant argument could be studied into some logical constructs upon terms that refer to immediate experience. The disputation is that each of the individual terms that comprises a sentence concern a bit of our empirical element and then through some logical exercise each of these terms could be shown to be amenable to some logical constructs which in turn could be shown to constitute the whole sentence. This assures empiricist explanation of knowledge, for here all our knowledge is ultimately tied to experience. This is the second dogma of empiricism that Quine refutes. Attack on these two dogmas of empiricism does not mean that Quine gives up empiricism. His aim is not to refuse empiricism but rather argue that the logical empiricists were not themselves sufficiently empirical in their outlook.

Kant claims that it is true that all our knowledge begins with experience, but it does not follow that all our knowledge arises from experience. There is something that

our faculty of knowledge supplies from itself. In may context Kant separates analytic truths from synthetic truths where analytic statements are defined as those whose denial involves self-contradiction. Denial of analytic statements brings one in self-contradiction, only because analytic truths are truths about language or its use. They do not tell us anything about the world. Denial of synthetic truths evidently does not generate contradiction for they are all contingent truths, varying with states of affairs in the world. When Kant asserts that even if with experience all our knowledge begins, it does not arise that all knowledge occurs from experience, Kant is expressing that there is something that our faculty provides from itself. Thus, if there is any knowledge that is independent of experiences, such a knowledge could be known as a priori. The a priori knowledge is regarded as pure by Kant, it is free from the combination of anything empirical. Of course, there could be a priori knowledge that is not pure in the sense that a piece of a priori knowledge could in succession be derived from experience or that an a priori knowledge could be partially dependent on experience. So, for Kant, pure knowledge is lacking of any empirical concern. Kant's agreement with Quine is confined to the view that analyticity fails to achieve a certain purpose. Quine then advances to deliberate a more modern account of analyticity, an account due in its essentials to Frege.[11]

If pure knowledge, by definition, is free from any empirical touch, then apparently experience cannot provide us with such knowledge. If pure knowledge is completely independent of experience, then once such knowledge is thought of, it is thought of as a necessary proposition. Necessity is the authentication of a prioricity and it is the criteria of a priori knowledge. Kant argues that propositions of mathematics and many such propositions that are in ordinary use are necessary and strictly universal in this sense. When we discuss analytic-synthetic distinction, the distinction is broadly understood in terms of judgements having subject-predicate structure. Analytic judgements are explanatory in nature. They clarify the meaning of the subject term. In synthetic judgements, however, the predicate lies outside the subject concept. It adds something new to the subject concept. Considered this manner, analytic judgements are true by virtue of meaning and synthetic judgements are true by virtue of supportive experience.

Frege declares that identity is a relation that applies between names of objects and not objects themselves.[12] He indicates that there is an important difference between a=a and a=b for the simple ground that a=a could be known a priori whereas a=b could never be known a priori, it involves an extension of knowledge for through scientific investigation we come to know that 'a' and 'b' refer to the same object. This upshots Frege to resolve that meaning is to be distinguished from reference. A judgement is articulated to consist of a singular term and a general term, one could talk of sense-reference distinction in both the cases of concrete and abstract singular terms. About the general term we could talk about what objects the general term is true of, if at all. In other words, we could talk about the extension of the general term. Thus, we have sense, meaning or intension on the one hand and

reference or extension on the other. Quine argues that once we are able to distinguish meaning from reference, an account of meaning is anticipated to explain synonymy of linguistic forms and analyticity of assertions. Meaning as an intermediary between language and world might well be discarded.

Objections to the concept of analyticity have been drawn, especially by Quine, on the explanation of supposed difficulties about meaning itself, and not merely on those about the status of the truths of logic. He identifies between two classes of analytic statements: Logically true analytic statements and analytic statements that are not logically true. 'No unmarried man is married' is an example of logically true analytic statement. This assertion is true under any explanation of 'man' and 'married'. 'No bachelor is married' is not a logically true analytic statement, some philosophers would assert that this statement is analytic, for, they would say, since 'bachelor' means the same as 'being unmarried', if we substitute the term 'bachelor' by its synonymous aspect, we derive once again a statement ('No unmarried men are married') which provides the logical law of identity, and so is analytic. It is clear that an account of the analytic type of the statements relies on the concepts of meaning and synonymy. Quine opposes that this classical method for describing analytic statements is unsuccessful, since in appealing to the notion of synonymy or sameness of meaning it makes use of a concept that is just as unclear and in need of further analysis as is the original concept of 'analyticity'.[13]

It is the second kind of analytic statement that is not logically true, we do this by defining 'bachelor' as 'unmarried man'. It is legitimate that we obtain this definition in the dictionary. But a lexicographer simply describes synonymy, does not state what it is to be synonymous. When we extend a definition, we justify a complex term in terms of a known vocabulary. And this so soon assumes a relation of synonymy containing between the definien and definiendum. What is necessary for us is to answer the question: "What are the necessary and sufficient conditions for two linguistic forms to be synonymous?' in a non-circular way. By and large definition comes as an account of existing usage. Other than rephrasing, definition also elaborates or constitutes to the meaning of the definiendum. When definition proposes at explaining the definiendum, it could maintain the linguistic communication of some preferred contexts and might aim at sharpening the usage of some other contexts. We rely on our thought of synonymy of the definiendum and the circumstances of use that need elaboration. Two alternative sets of definien could emerge by explaining the same definiendum, where these two sets of explanations could be interchangeable in some circumstances and may not be so in some other circumstances. In all these cases, the idea of definition rests on a prior idea of synonymy. There could be, however, one kind of definition where we introduce novel notations for the purpose of sheer abbreviation. This is the convention that is followed in physical sciences. Here we create synonyms by definition. All other cases of definition involve resting on synonymy, rather than explaining it. Sometimes in formal sciences definition is introduced to achieve economy both in cases of expression where concise notations are introduced to

express a large number of concepts, and also to achieve economy in grammar and vocabulary where notations are formed for a minimum number of basic concepts yielding the possibility of expressing a large number of concepts by combination and iteration of basic concepts. Normally what happens in these attempts to have an economy is that there emerge two languages viz. the inclusive language and the part language where we also formulate rules of translation between these two languages. These rules are called definitions that correlate the two languages. However, the main point worth noting is that all these attempts of introducing definition, except where definition is introduced through a newly created notation, hinge on a prior relation of synonymy. But what we need is an account of definition that is independent of synonymy. This indicates that Quine's approach is far more revolutionary than might initially come out. It is one thing to abandon a philosophical distinction, another thing entirely to abandon the intuitive notion of sentence meaning.[14] Quine thus looks to be indicating for a full-fledged interpretation of meaning-scepticism: there is no fact of the matter as to what any imparted sentence or linguistic aspect means.

IV

The distinction between analytic and synthetic judgments in Kant's philosophy is an important episode in the history of modern philosophy as well as a landmark for logic, language and meaning. Kant asserts the worth of its exposing and of imparting it into association with the traditional distinction between analytic and synthetic distinction. The distinction between old and new content, which is all that is really contained in Kant's distinction between analytic and synthetic judgments, and which, so evaluated, has a sharp illuminating value, is established to carry an unreal one by being supposed to be a distinction between essentially different kinds of judgments. In the same vein, Quine argues successfully against a form of the distinction that was supposed to provide a particular solution to certain epistemological problems; and this has considerable philosophical illustriousness. Quine thus finds the classical notion of analytic truth as an outdated and conservative concept that has never been happily clarified and demarcated. Close investigation of Quine's criticism of the explanations of analytic-synthetic distinction reveals that most of his objections are persuasive only if they are considered in relation to natural language.

P.F. Strawson and H.P. Grice both are the earlier critics of Quine's notation of analytic-synthetic distinction.[15] They argue that it cannot be simply that we have not yet clarified the distinction in a rigorous manner such as: the terms " 'analytic' and 'synthetic' have a more or less established philosophical use," and there is fairly uniform agreement as to how they should be applied in a large, open-ended class of cases, it follows that "it is absurd, even senseless, to say that there is no such distinction". However, they do not desire to refuse many of Quine's points "are of first importance in connection with the problem of giving a satisfactory general account of analyticity and related concepts." Hilary Putnam thinks that though much of Quine's critique is well taken and is also true, the assumption that

the analytic-synthetic distinction does not exist is not true.[16] He offers the argument that there are analytic and a priori truths in our language and conceptual scheme since it is rational to accept them and not to give them up on the slightest pretext. Putnam, however, appreciates the fact that no single definition of analyticity exists and that no boundary has been finally fixed. Thus, he is sympathetic with Quine in the latter's crusade against the general complacency of analytic thinkers.

Quine distinguishes the theory of reference from theory of meaning. He is not interested in discussing the meaningfulness of the analytic statements, but he is interested in examining the nature of analyticity formulated by Kant and criticizes it and also it was an attempt to attack on the linguistic conception of logical truth, supported by Carnap and others. From within this naturalistic framework Quine argued that meaning is indeterminate, reference is inscrutable, ontology is relative, theories are underdetermined by experience in principle, the truth value of any sentence or statement can be revised, that there are no meanings, no propositions, no attributes, no relations, no numbers, no synonymity, no facts, no analytic truths, and so forth. He is skeptical of notions associated with the theory of meaning, such as those of meaning, intension, synonymy, analyticity and necessity.

When we find the disapproval made by Quine about the distinction between analytic and synthetic statements, one problem that focuses on us is whether Quine denies the very existence of analytic statements i.e. the statements which do not require any confirmation. However, he is not found anywhere rejecting the very existence of such statements. Quine has been sympathetic to the a priori but not in the traditional sense. He has been highly dissatisfied with the official doctrine of analyticity as he has found that the notion itself is not clearly defined and, above all, it has not been properly demarcated from the so-called synthetic truth. However, both Kant and Quine agree that analyticity would not solve the problem of a priori knowledge, at this level they partially company. Kant's agreement with Quine is confined to the view that analyticity fails to achieve a certain purpose. Thus, if this is a fact, apart from their different metaphysical positions, with the analytic in general, as with the synthetic in particular, understanding Kant as accomplishing a Quinean insight presents us to make sense of some of his deepest remarks.

Notes and references:

1. Immanuel Kant addressed the concepts of analytic and synthetic for the first time in the much-neglected prize essay of 1762: "Untersuchung über die Deutlichkeit der Grundsätze der natürlichen Theologie und der Moral," and revived to it in the *Critique of Pure Reason* in the section entitled "The Discipline of Pure Reason in its Dogmatic Employment" particularly A715-718/B743-746, and A837/B865. For detail discussion see W. H. Wermeister, Analytic and Synthetic Concepts According to Kant's Logik, *The Southwestern Journal of Philosophy*, Summer, 1973, Vol. 4, No.2, pp.25-28.

2. Throughout this paper, I usually follow the translation of Paul Guyer and Allen Wood, *Critique of Pure Reason,* Cambridge University Press (1998) and also Norman Kemp Smith, *Critique of Pure Reason*, Palgrave Macmillan, 1929.

3. For this discussion see W. V. Quine, "Two Dogmas of Empiricism," *Philosophical Review*, Vol. LX (1951), pp. 20-41; M. G. White, "The Analytic and the Synthetic-an Un tenable Dualism," in *John Dewey, Philosopher of Science and Freedom*, ed. by S. Hook (New York, 1950), pp. 316-30. For similar assertions please see R. Rudner, "Formal and Non-Formal," *Philosophy of Science*, Vol. XVI (1949), pp. 41-48; F. Waismann, "Analytic-Synthetic," *Analysis*, Vols. X-XI (1949-50, 1950-51), esp. parts III and IV (Vol. XI, pp. 53-61, 115-121); J. Wild and J. L. Coblitz, "Concerning the Distinction between the Analytic and the Synthetic," *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, Vol. VIII (1947-48), pp. 651-667.

4. Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, A6-7, B10, tr. by N. Kemp Smith (London, 1929).

5. In the preface to the first edition, Kant explicates that by a "*Critique of Pure Reason*" he intends a critique "of the faculty of reason in general, in respect of all knowledge after which it may strive independently of all experience" and that he intends to resolve on "the possibility or impossibility of metaphysics".

6. The **"plain historical method"** is the phrase which Locke coined to describe his empiricist philosophy in *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, ed. with Introduction by P. H. Nidditch (Oxford, 1975).

7. Regarding the discussion of George Berkeley's treatment of metaphysics please see *The Works of George Berkeley Bishop of Cloyne*, eds. A.A. Luce and T.E. Jessop (9 vols.; London: Thomas Nelson and Sons Ltd, 1948-57), 2:45. Among philosophers writing on Berkeley, Bennett and Yandell have been among the most dismissive, and Rescher and Lemos have made similar appraisals. See Jonathan Bennett, *Learning from Six Philosophers* (2 vols.; Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2001), 2:177; David Yandell, "Berkeley on Common Sense and the Privacy of Ideas," *History of Philosophy Quarterly* 12 (1995): 411-23; Nicholas Rescher, *Common Sense: A New Look at an Old Philosophical Tradition* (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 2005), 209; and Noah Lemos, *Common Sense: A Contemporary Defense* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 11.

8. There is comprehensive literature on exactly how Hume aroused Kant from his dogmatic slumbers. Lewis White Beck constituted the classic perspective that it was Hume's doubts about causation that aroused Kant from his dogmatic slumber; see, for example, "A Prussian Hume and a Scottish Kant," in Beck, *Essays on Kant and Hume* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1978), 111-129. Lothar Kreimendahl, by differentiate, he has indicated that Hume awakened Kant from his dogmatic slumber by acquiring him to see that pure reason is responsible to antinomies; see his *Kant - Der Durchbruch von 1769* (Köln: Jürgen Dinter, 1990), and the earlier Günter Gawlick and Lothar Kreimendahl, *Hume in der deutschen Aufklärung: Umrisse einer Rezeptionsgeschichte* (Stuttgart-Bad Canstatt: Fromann Holzboog, 1987.

9. Manfred Kuehn undertook to intermediate between these two perspectives by indicating that it was an antinomy about causation which Kant commented in Hume

- that everything must have a cause yet that the world as a whole cannot have a cause - that aroused him from his dogmatic slumber; see his "Kant's Conception of Hume's Problem," *Journal of the History of Philosophy* 21 (1983): 175-93.

10. W. V. Quine, *From a Logical Point of View*, 2d ed. (Harvard University Press, 1961, 1980), pp. 20.

11. Moreover, the analytic-synthetic distinction presented here is a conception within true propositions. As a matter of fact, Kant does not extend his distinction to assure false propositions, although it would be easy for him to do so. For his purposes (and for Frege's) all that is needed is a segmentation of truths. See G. Frege, *The Foundations of Arithmetic*, tr. by J. L. Austin (Oxford, 1953) and also Michael Dummett's, *Frege: Philosophy of Language* (New York: Harper & Row, 1973).

12. Regarding the discussion of how Frege's views about identity develop with his conception of his logicism, see Robert May, 'Frege on Identity Statements', in C. Cecchetto, G. Chierchia, and M.T. Guasti, eds., *Semantic Interfaces: Reference, Anaphora and Aspect* (Stanford: CSLI Publications 2001) and also see Gottlob Frege, 'On Sense and Meaning/ trans. M. Black, in *Collected Papers on Mathematics, Logic, and Philosophy* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell 1984) 157-77.

13. Quine admitted that the real significance of his critique of the analytic-synthetic distinction is not so much that there is no such thing as that no epistemological work can be through with it. He articulates 'I now perceive that the philosophically important question about analyticity and the linguistic doctrine of logical truth is not how to explicate them; it is the question rather of their relevance to epistemology. Quine's classic discussions are 'Two Dogmas of Empiricism' in his *From a Logical Point of View* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1953) and chapter 2 of *Word and Object* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1960).

14. For this discussion see Jerrold Katz's contributions, for example, 'Some Remarks on Quine on Analyticity' *Journal of Philosophy* 64 (1967) pp. 36-52, 'Where Things Stand with the Analytic-Synthetic Distinction' *Synthese* 28 (1974) pp. 283-319, and 'The Refutation of Indeterminacy' in *Perspectives on Quine* edited by R. Barrett and R. Gibson (Oxford: Blackwell, 1990).

15. H.P. Grice and P.F. Strawson, 'In Defence of a Dogma', *Philosophical Review* (1956). W. V. Quine, 'Two Dogmas of Empiricism', in *From a Logical Point of View*, 2nd edn. (Cambridge, Mass, 1961).

16. It is remarkable enough that Hilary Putnam has brought something akin to this distinction to appraise Quine's doctrines about apriority and unrevisability. Please see the postscripts to "There Is at Least One A Priori Truth," Erkenntnis 13 (1978): 153-70. Putnam's appraisal of the importance of Quine's famous essay "Two Dogmas Revisited," in G. Ryle ed., *Contemporary Aspects of Philosophy* (Oriel, 1978) and also see "There is at least One a priori Truth" in *Realism and Reason* (*Philosophical Papers* Vol. 3) (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1975.