

Immanuel Kant: A Forerunner of Phenomenology

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Abstract

Edmund Husserl is widely regarded as the father of phenomenology, having developed the field in the 20th century and identifying himself as its pioneer in methodology and original philosophical inquiry. However, Phenomenological studies have existed in philosophical discussions throughout history. In particular, Immanuel Kant has introduced phenomenological temperament and used it generously in metaphysical and epistemic framework that can be vouched foundational in phenomenology of the 20th century. The study of noumena, phenomena, transcendental philosophy, and synthetic a priori and posterior has been dynamically instrumental in later philosophies-phenomenology in distinct.

Thus, this study aims to determine Kant's contribution towards the development of various sediments in phenomenology, which are fundamentally foundational and irreplaceable to the development of phenomenology as a movement. This substantiates Kant as the forerunner of phenomenology.

Keywords: Intentionality, Husserl, Kant, Noumena, Phenomena, Phenomenology, Transcendental

Introduction

Immanuel Kant (1724–1804) is a crucial figure in the history of philosophy for laying the essential groundwork for the development of phenomenology by delving into our knowledge and experience of the world. Kant's Philosophy is a critical and synthetic in approach to the two dogmatic dynamics of modern philosophy-rationalism and empiricism. His claim of revolution in philosophical discourse not only stood a distinct critical system, but it has paved the dynamic outlook in the domain of philosophy, constructing foundational elements in his work for postmodern, continental, and Phenomenological philosophies. Kant's critical philosophy, notably presented in his Critique of Pure Reason (1781), altered the boundaries of Metaphysics, Epistemology, Ethics and Aesthetics influencing subsequent phenomenological philosophers like Edmund Husserl, Martin

Heidegger, Jean Paul Sartre, Levinas, and Mourley Ponty.

The key concepts and philosophical discourses that have been instrumentally foundational for Phenomenology in particular as for the concern of this paper are *Transcendental Idealism*, *Noumena (things-in-themselves)*, and *Phenomena (things of appearance)*, *Consciousness*, *Subjectivity*, *Perception*, *Aesthetic*, etc. In the current development, many thinkers have expressively articulated the embedded phenomenology in Kant's Critical Philosophy, beginning with the founding phenomenologists.

From the following studies/reviews, it has been found that how Kant's critical philosophy played a foundational to phenomenology: Mazijk, C. (2020), (here, Husserl's relation to Kant as well as to neo-Kantianism is acknowledged in his own words in a letter to Cassirer of 1925); Luft, Sebastian. (2018), (The connection between phenomenology, Kant, and Kantian philosophy is historically and systematically being exposed); Kinkaid, J. (2018), (Heidegger approves that Kant's philosophy validates the direction of his philosophical journey leading up to *Being and Time*); Rockmore, Tom (2005), (Rockmore considers Kant's emphasis on the prerequisites of experience creates a structure that phenomenologists use to investigate consciousness and its objects); Barker, J. (2017), (in the paper the non-conceptual foundation of aesthetic sensibility of Kant and Ponty is delt); Heidegger, M., Emad, P., & Maly, K. (1997), (in this book the Heidegger provides a deep analysis of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, delving into the essence of knowledge, experience, and the boundaries of human rationality); Sartre, Jean-Paul, Hazel E. Barnes, (1992), (where he addresses intentionality and critiques Kant's categories); Levinas Emmanuel, Alphonso Lingis (1969), (where he critiques totalizing approaches in ethics of Kant). This paper joins this club to claim that Kant's ground breaking works in epistemology paves a foundation for Phenomenology

The paper is divided into three sections to demonstrate that Kant was a forerunner/precursor to Phenomenology. The first section of the paper discusses Kant's critical philosophy, focusing on the key thematic ideas that were pivotal in making Kant's philosophy deeply critical and revolutionary, known as the Copernican revolution. The second section, of the paper discusses Kant's ideas that have influenced phenomenology thinkers, who have either critiqued, expanded upon, or fully embraced his concepts. As for the third section, the paper seeks to highlight the concepts that are foundational sediments of Phenomenology embedded in Kant.

I

Critical Philosophy of Kant

Immanuel Kant's 'Critique of Pure Reason', fundamentally transforms our comprehension of knowledge. The core of Kant's argument is based on the idea of transcendental idealism, which suggests that our minds actively shape how we experience the world. It questions the conventional empiricist belief that knowledge mainly comes from sensory experiences. Kant contended that space and

time are not concepts based on outer experiences, but are prerequisites for experiencing things. Contrary to empirical concepts, a priori intuitions are fundamental aspects of the mind that enable us to perceive phenomena instead of being based on particular observations. Space and time provide the structures in which we make sense of sensory information, influencing our perception of our surroundings. He argues that *'space and time are pure forms of all intuition contributed by our own faculty of sensibility, and therefore forms of which we can have a priori knowledge* (Kant 7).

According to him, space is not just the external realm where objects are located; it is a fundamental requirement for being able to perceive those objects. Likewise, time is not solely a way to gauge alterations, but a fundamental aspect in organizing our encounters. Kant asserts, that space and time are essential to every human experience when viewed as intuitions. Lacking these intuitions would make it impossible to have a cohesive experience, as we would be unable to understand the connections between objects or the sequence of events.

Therefore, the active role of the mind is necessitated. The mind is not simply a passive receiver of sensory data. Instead, it categorizes and combines the information proactively using natural groups. Categories like causality, unity, and plurality help us create cohesive understandings of the world. Knowledge is more than just collecting information; it involves the mind's structures actively constructing the understanding. Understanding how we perceive causality is crucially dependent on the process of synthesis. For example, if we see a ball rolling down a hill, we don't just see it moving; we analyze it in terms of causality and attribute its motion to gravity. Kant maintains that this assignment is not obtained from direct observation but is an essential assumption for understanding our perceptions. Kant substantially alters our perception of human knowledge and understanding. At the core of his philosophy lies the idea of categories - inherent mental structures used to arrange and understand sensory information. This model questions the idea that all knowledge comes only from firsthand experience, as proposed by empiricism. Kant explains that while all knowledge starts with experience, it does not necessarily come solely from experience. 'The store is currently closed for 'inventory' (Kant, Critique of Pure Reason AXX) captures the core of his transcendental idealism and emphasizes the crucial function of categories in human cognition. He categorizes twelve basic concepts into four groups: Quantity (Unity, Plurality, and Totality), Quality (Reality, Negation, and Limitation), and Relation (Inherence and Subsistence, Causality and Dependence, Community), and Modality (Possibility, Existence, Necessity). These classifications do not come from experience but from inherent concepts that organize how we comprehend the physical world. They act as filters that help us understand the jumbled information we receive through our senses. For example, the idea of causality allows us to comprehend connections between events by identifying one event as the reason for another. As we watch a ball move down a slope, our brains use the concept of causality to understand that gravity is the

reason for its movement. Without these classifications, our experiences would be fragmented and incomprehensible, appearing as simply sensations lacking cohesion (Kant 8).

Kant's claim that "*But although all our cognition commences with experience, yet it does not on that account all arise from experience*" in (Critique of Pure Reason. B2) demonstrates his conviction in the mind's active involvement in forming knowledge. Sensory encounters supply the basic information, but it is through the use of categories that we convert these encounters into understanding. This procedure shows that human cognition is not a passive absorption of information; instead, it is an active creation supported by the innate structures of the mind (Kant 136).

This differentiation is important to think about when discussing the boundaries of human understanding. Kant states that we can understand *phenomena* (the world as it appears), but we are unable to perceive *noumena* (the world as it truly is). The categories help us understand the world of experiences, but they do not apply to things beyond our perception. This results in Kant's significant realization: our experiences do not solely define the limits of human knowledge, but also the cognitive structures we employ to understand them. He stresses that although we can understand phenomena, which is how the world appears to us, noumena, or objects as they truly are, are inaccessible to us. This difference is important as it claims that our understanding is primarily influenced by how we perceive things (Critique of Pure Reason A20/B34 to A30/B46) (Kant 257-276).

Kant's critical method recognizes the intrinsic constraints of human rationality. As He says, "So I have been forced to deny knowledge to make space for faith" (Critique of Pure Reason, 1787,). This emphasizes that while empirical knowledge can be attained regarding phenomena, skepticism is necessary when making claims about the noumenal world. Kant does not reject the presence of reality outside human perception; instead, he asserts that it is outside the capabilities of our cognitive abilities. The differentiation of phenomena and noumena is fundamental to his theory of knowledge. Phenomena are the things we can perceive and comprehend through our senses and mental abilities. On the other hand, noumena are the entities that exist on their own, separate from how humans perceive them. Kant suggests that our understanding is confined to the first, since our encounters are influenced by the innate structures of the mind, such as space, time, and the categories of understanding.

This restriction has significant consequences. Although we can form a logical comprehension of the world from our experiences, Kant cautions that this comprehension does not apply to things-in-themselves. We cannot perceive things as they are, beyond our perceptual frameworks. This extreme doubt questions our ability to have an unbiased understanding of the external world, suggesting that exploring metaphysical concepts related to the noumenal realm may be pointless. (Critique of Pure Reason, 1781, (B337) p. 376)

Kant's critical method requires doubt regarding assertions that go beyond empirical evidence. Despite, having beliefs and intuitive ideas about the noumenal realm, Kant claims that they cannot be supported by knowledge. He suggests, that using reason prompts us to ask such questions, but it also highlights its boundaries. This interaction demonstrates a main conflict in Kant's philosophy: the longing for knowledge and the acknowledgment of our limits in understanding. Kant expresses an important philosophical stance that if knowledge claims lack a foundation in experience, they should be viewed as beliefs or faith rather than objective knowledge. This position allows for conversations on morality, ethics, and the presence of God, which are important aspects of human life but cannot be proven through empirical research.

Kant's investigation into categories has deep impacts on both philosophy and the sciences. By demonstrating that categories influence our comprehension, he calls for a reassessment of our knowledge acquisition methods. In the field of natural sciences, causality plays a fundamental role in the scientific method by enabling the creation of hypotheses and the development of laws. Researchers depend on this structure to make links, between observed events and forecast future happenings. (Critique of Pure Reason, 1781, (B 90) p. 201)

Furthermore, Kant's concepts stimulate philosophical debates on the essence of reality and human cognition. If these categories fundamentally shape how we view the world, concerns about the objectivity of knowledge come to light. How much can we say, we understand the world as it actually is considering that our perceptions are always influenced by our ways of thinking?

Kant's ideas in the sciences promote an emphasis on empirical research while recognizing the limitations of scientific understanding. The scientific method uses observation and experimentation to gain an understanding of the world, however, Kant's framework highlights that some aspects of reality, especially those concerning the fundamental nature of existence, may still be unknown. (Critique of Pure Reason, 1781, (B28-29) p. 151)

II

Kant's transcendental philosophy established key ideas that impacted phenomenological thinking, especially in epistemology and the study of consciousness. Kant's Critique of Pure Reason brought about a ground breaking way of comprehending human cognition and experience. His belief in transcendental idealism, where our understanding of the outside world is influenced by the cognitive structures of the mind, impacted the way phenomenological methods are used to study consciousness.

Kant made a distinction between phenomena (how the world appears to us) and noumena (things as they are in themselves). This difference laid the foundation for phenomenology's emphasis on how objects are perceived and formed within consciousness, rather than assuming a connection to a reality beyond experience. As Kant explains in the Preface to the Second Edition:

“We can never know things-in-themselves, but only of things as they appear to us” (Kant, B xxvii.)

Husserl deals the same it as ‘Returning to the things themselves’ (Husserl 2001, 168).

‘But to judge rationally or scientifically about things signifies to conform to the things themselves or to go from words and opinions back to the things themselves, to consult them in their self-givenness and to set aside all prejudices alien to them’ (Husserl 35).

Here, Husserl’s understands that to evaluate logically or empirically is to be in harmony with the actual objects rather than just personal beliefs. This includes seeking advice from the physical items and putting aside any prejudices.

Heidegger, like Husserl’s concern to go to things themselves, says the maxim of “phenomenology” can be formulated as “To the things themselves” (BT, 50, 58) (Heidegger 50-58).

Again, the idea things themselves is discussed by Heidegger with some similarity to Husserl’s focus on directly approaching things, argues that the principle of "phenomenology" can be expressed as "To the things themselves."

Kant in his discussion on forms of sensibility and categories brings concepts of space and time as innate aspects of perception, along with his essential categories like causality and substance, which had a direct impact on phenomenologists exploring the influence of these frameworks on our perception of reality. Kant suggests that space and time are not based on experience but are essential prerequisites for having experiences. Space and time are not concrete ideas derived from our observations, but rather abstract concepts. They represent the necessary conditions for experience to occur (Kant, A 24/B 38).

Phenomenologists, such as Husserl, expanded on this idea by studying how consciousness organizes experience through intentional actions, which can be viewed as a continuation of Kant's investigation into how our mental abilities influence experience.

Kant's Epistemological interest in the boundaries of human understanding and the requirements for knowledge aligns with phenomenology's goal of exploring the fundamental aspects of lived experience. Kant's focus on the innate prerequisites for understanding established a foundation for investigating the factors influencing consciousness in phenomenology.

Kant claims that knowledge is based on synthetic a priori judgments that form the foundation of empirical science. In philosophical understanding, it is essential to pursue a priori knowledge, which can be understood without relying on experience yet still offers valuable insights into the essence of things (Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, B 82). Husserl aimed to delve deeper into these conditions, examining how the transcendental ego organizes experience. Husserl's phenomenology can be

viewed as a direct reaction to and progression of Kantian concepts. Even though Husserl found fault with Kant's exploring the consequences of his transcendental analysis, he adopted and elaborated on Kant's emphasis on consciousness and the prerequisites of experience.

The concept of intentionality, as formulated by Husserl, posits that consciousness is constantly directed towards an object, and can be interpreted as an extension of Kant's notions regarding the influence of cognitive structures on our perception. Husserl states: "Every instance of awareness is focused on an item; this connection of awareness to its item is what I refer to as intentionality" (Husserl, *Logical Investigations*, Vol. 1, page 108).

Husserl's method of phenomenological reduction expands on Kant's examination of the conditions of knowledge by suspending judgments on the external world to focus on consciousness content. This reduction aims to reveal the fundamental patterns of experience, mirroring Kant's focus on the inherent conditions of knowledge. The phenomenological reduction involves stepping back from our experiences to focus on their essence, disregarding preconceived notions about their existence (Husserl, *Ideas*, § 31).

Phenomenologists draw upon Kant's ideas about the cognitive structures that influence our experience, showing his impact on the fields of phenomenology. Even though Husserl aimed to surpass Kant by emphasizing the structures of consciousness, he recognized Kant's crucial influence in preparing the groundwork for these explorations.

III

Sediments of Phenomenology in Kant's Philosophy

Kant has had a substantial impact on phenomenology, particularly in shaping how upcoming philosophers approach consciousness and experience. His ideas laid the groundwork for phenomenological theories about intentionality and structures of experience. Let's list some of the areas where Kant's philosophy converges with Phenomenology or it has influenced Phenomenological investigation. One of such significant intercourse has been occurred in the notion of intentionality. Kant didn't address intentionality directly as later philosophers did, but his idea that mind always directs itself towards objects of experience set the groundwork for key concept in phenomenology. Kant's investigation into how our cognitive capacities impact our understanding aligns with the phenomenological emphasis on the relationship between consciousness and the objects it observes. Though Kant did not explicitly discuss intentionality, his belief that mind inherently orients itself towards objects of perception, introduced a key concept that later influenced phenomenological philosophy. (Kant, 1781/1998; Husserl, 1970). Kant examines how space and time function as intuitional forms that influence our perception of objects in the *Transcendental Aesthetic* (A19/B33). In the *Transcendental Analytic* (A51/B75), he further explains the function of understanding in combining experiences to create understanding. (Kant 60-70). "Husserl had the peculiar

custom to understand philosophy as a single, progressive, and universal task in which all individual thinkers partake. Kant, in this respect, is read by Husserl as he read all others: as a precursor of philosophy's genuine historical end-form. This end-form, as Husserl increasingly stressed, is his own philosophy. Accordingly, it is probably best to understand the critique of Kant drawn out in this paper in the light of Husserl's attempted self-understanding, rather than as a Kant interpretation in its own right" (Van Mazijk)

According to Kant, mind has a built-in structure that allows it to interact with objects. He proposes that all knowledge originates from sensory experiences, which are then, interpreted through the mind's innate categories. This means that our experiences are always directed towards something, be it an object outside of ourselves, an idea, or a mental state.

In Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, categories are essential as they help our mind organize sensorial data through concepts such as causality, substance, and unity. These categories are innate conditions that create the possibility for experience, rather than being shaped by experience themselves. Hence, when we look at an object, we are not just taking in data; our cognitive process plays a role in shaping that perception. This interaction highlights the focus of consciousness on objects. Kant argues that concepts such as causality and substance are inherent elements that mold our sensory perception, underscoring the influence our cognitive functions have on how we perceive the world (Kant 100-150). Husserl phenomenology of time and consciousness of time is compared and contrasted with the Kant notion of time and its experience. He says, - "In the continuous progression from seizing-upon to seizing-upon, in a certain way, I said, we now seize upon the stream of mental processes as a unity. We do not seize upon it as we do a single mental process but rather in the manner of an idea in the Kantian sense" (Husserl 197).

Kant explains that intuition and thinking can be considered types of representation, with representation being understood in a broad sense as representation. Therefore, we need to remember that thinking is also a form of representing, it presents something in its unique way, not directly but through mediation. Thinking can only serve intuition and be a tool for primary presentation when it aligns with its own nature by presenting something. (Heidegger 62)

Kant differentiates between phenomena (the world as perceived) and noumena (the world as it is). Even though we can only perceive phenomena, our comprehension is ultimately focused on noumena, revealing a fundamental purpose in our cognitive functions. In the Transcendental Dialectic (A254/B310), he talks openly about the difference between what we can observe (phenomena) and what exists apart from our perception (noumena). (Kant 228-229). Kant goes into more detail in the Transcendental Analytic (A80/B106) about our restricted knowledge of phenomena, highlighting the human mind's role in organizing experience. (Kant 109-110)

Kant's system of categories categorizes sensory information and impacted the way experiences are scrutinized in the phenomenological approach. His conviction that the way we view the world is shaped by these ingrained categories drives an in-depth examination of the structures underlying human perception. This he distinctly delineates in *Transcendental Analytic* (A50/B74, A100-103/B133-136). (Kant 87-89,143-146). Phenomena refer to the items we observe, impacted by our senses and cognitive skills. Here is a detailed explanation of the idea. The mouse was chased by the cat throughout the house. The cat chased the mouse all around the house. The concept of illusion compared to reality. Kant differentiates between phenomena and noumena. Phenomena are the manifestations of how objects are seen and felt in the world, reflecting the visible aspects of objects. In contrast, noumena are objects that exist independently from our perception of them. Kant believed that our perception is limited to phenomena and we do not have direct access to noumena. Our understanding of the world is constantly shaped by our experiences of phenomena.

Phenomena occur, however, when our senses engage with the outside world. When we look at something, we are not seeing the actual object but the sensory data that our brains process. When we gaze at a tree, we're essentially seeing light reflect off the tree and then enter our brain for interpretation (Husserl 7-8,19-20). "Importantly, on Husserl's reading, this Kantian concept of a priori—as involving a complete reduction of the concrete contents of experience through a kind of formalizing method—is mistaken" (Van Mazijk). Husserl derives the idea of transcendental object which are not given to us in complete. He mentions as follows, - "§143. Adequate Physical Thing-Givenness as Idea in the Kantian Sense. Of essential necessity there are only given, we said, inadequately appearing (thus also only inadequately perceivable) objects. We said: inadequately perceivable in a closed appearance. There are objects — and included here are all transcendent objects, all "realities" comprised by the name Nature or World — which cannot be given in complete determinedness and, likewise, in complete intuitiveness in a closed consciousness. But perfect givenness is nevertheless predestinated as "Idea" (in the Kantian sense) — as a system which, in its eidetic type, is an absolutely determined system of endless processes of continuous appearances, or as a field of these processes, an a priori determined continuum of appearances with different, but determined, dimensions, and governed throughout by a fixed set of eidetic laws" (Husserl 342)

Kant claims that our mind uses categories to organize sensory information, which are fundamental concepts that form our perception. These categories include ideas like causality, fundamental nature, entirety, and variety. Our brain relies on the concept of causation to understand the relationship between a series of events, seeing one event as the cause of another. One can thus understand how Kant's thoughts shaped Husserl's thought in a very significant manner.

Providing primacy for intuitions and categories, Kant widens the room for transcendental idealism, which explains how our minds shape what we experience,

though these experiences still represent the true nature of things (noumena). However, our limited understanding of only witnessing phenomena prevents us from claiming to fully understand the true nature of things in their independent existence. Kant's examination of phenomena underscores the limits of human understanding. He argues that our perception of the world is shaped by our senses and thoughts, despite gaining knowledge through firsthand experiences.

Kant believed that noumena exist in their genuine state, independent from our perception or encounter of them. Phenomena are the way things seem to us based on our senses and cognitive abilities, whereas noumena are the true reality that exists separate from our sensory perceptions. "The concept of a thing in itself, or a noumenon, is not an object of experience." (Kant 150).

Noumena exist independently from our cognitive abilities. Our understanding is limited to observable events, meaning we cannot directly perceive them. Kant argues that despite our ability to imagine noumena, we cannot gain knowledge of them through empirical data. This emphasizes the limitations of human understanding. "We are unable to truly understand the essence of things, only their outer manifestations." (Kant 20). Kant's distinction between noumena and phenomena challenges traditional metaphysics and leads to investigations into the nature of reality and our capacity to understand it. Therefore, Kant's transcendental epistemology emphasizes the significance of categories in gaining knowledge and understanding experiences. These categorizations are inherent cognitive frameworks that impact our understanding and interpretation of the world. Kant argues that for an experience to have meaning, it must be structured by concepts that exist before the experience itself. Categories are basic ideas the mind uses to organize sensory data. They include ideas such as unity, variety, logic and outcome, and certainty. Kant claims that if we did not have these categories, we would only have sensory perceptions without any structured understanding. He contends that experience requires active engagement from our cognitive abilities, rather than just passively receiving information. The mind sorts sensory information to assist us in forming evaluations about our surroundings. Husserl agrees with Kant that being is not a predicate, that is, that the existing situation is not a property of the individual object (the white paper). Saying that something is does not give us an intuition of a new property in a manner similar to learning 'something is red'. But this shows for Husserl that assertion of the category of being does not involve grasping a property or the object itself (Husserl XI).

Kant's categories set the limits of our understanding, defining what can be known. He distinguishes phenomena (how we see the world, influenced by our thoughts) and noumena (the world as it truly is, outside our grasp). This distinction shows that, while our understanding is shaped by categories, there are aspects of reality that go beyond our cognitive reach. Kant's concept of cognitive synthesis entails the mind combining sensory inputs using categories. This procedure is essential for creating unified experiences. One example is how the idea of causality enables us to understand that a certain event can result from another, providing a framework

for describing transformation and connection in the world. Kant's idea of cognitive synthesis involves the mind blending sensory inputs with categories. This process is crucial for establishing cohesive experiences. One instance is the concept of causality which helps us comprehend how a specific event can stem from another, offering a structure for explaining change and linkage in the world. Husserl agrees with Kant concerning the sensory matter of most of our concepts, but holds that in higher order intuitions we do have the capacity to intuit ideal *categorical entities*, from the 'mixed category' of the concept of colour, to pure categories, and at the highest level, logical categories such as unity, plurality and existence. Husserl treats *categorical intuition* as akin to a kind of perception (Husserl XI).

Amidst his obsession towards pure experience Husserl lays utmost importance to the role of transcendental ego in the process of knowledge formation. His inclination towards subjectivity and life world can have significant borrowings from Kant's notion of mind's role in the formation of knowledge.

Conclusion

Kant's ideas set the groundwork for not only for Husserlian brand of Philosophy but also later phenomenologists who sought to explore the structures of consciousness and the nature of experience. Even though Kant doesn't explicitly discuss it, his idea that consciousness is directed toward objects aligns with phenomenological principles. Later philosophers like Husserl emphasized that consciousness is constantly focused on an object, surpassing Kant's sharp separation between noumena and phenomena. Phenomenologists build upon Kant's structure by examining the process of how perceptions are created within the mind. They highlight the significance of personal experience and the impact of our perception on our worldview, frequently choosing to focus on unfiltered experiences while disregarding the unknown. The goal of our investigation is to comprehend the circumstances that allow us to consider the potential existence of objects independent of our perception. (Kant 287). Kant's criticism of metaphysics centers on the boundaries of knowledge and questions metaphysical assertions about the noumenal realm. This uncertainty affects phenomenologists who prioritize studying lived experience over delving into metaphysical theorizing. These concepts and the philosophical stance of Kant are fundamental to phenomenology and therefore it is acutely worth enough to claim that Kant is a forerunner of Phenomenology

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