Critiquing Anscombe’s Critiques of Kant

Abstract

This paper critiques G.E.M. Anscombe's critiques of Immanuel Kant, particularly in relation to moral psychology, the concept of good will, and the categorical imperative. Anscombe in her essay Modern Moral Philosophy, argues that Kant's moral framework fails to offer a satisfactory guide for moral action, human flourishing and overlooks the importance of ends or outcomes in ethical decision-making. Contrary to this, the paper argues that Kantian ethics, with its emphasis on goodwill—the intention to act out of duty and respect for the moral law—incorporates a psychological dimension into moral action. The paper concludes by demonstrating the coherence and relevance of Kant's ethical system, particularly through the role of good will, in addressing Anscombe's concerns about moral psychology, the categorical imperative, and the significance of ends in moral reasoning.